从代理成本角度看中国国有企业融资结构的确定

On China's SOEs' Financing Structure by the Agency Cost Theory

Jensen和Meckling模型认为债权人与股东、外部股东与内部股东之间存在着委托代理关系 ,由于利益关系的冲突 ,不同融资方式会导致代理成本的产生从而影响企业的市场价值 ,市场价值最大化必然要求代理成本最小化 ,从而可以确定债务融资、外部股权融资之间的最优比例。本文在概述了模型的基本思想后 ,着重分析了“拨改贷”前后和股票市场发展以来等不同阶段我国国有企业融资结构与代理成本的关系 ,论述了国家与企业、国有股与社会公众股、股东与银行之间的委托代理关系 ,从代理成本的角度重新思考了我国国有企业融资结构问题。

Michael C.Jensen and William H.Meckling argued that agency costs will arise because of the different interests between principals and agents.Such agency costs exists in the interaction between shareholders and managers as well as between creditors and shareholders.Different financing patterns and capital structure will absolutely influence the agency costs.To minimize the agency costs,an enterprise must determine its optimal financing pattern and capital structure.This conclusion is essential in understanding the importance of the financing pattern and capital structure of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).Jensen and Meckling provide a good doctrine to analyze the financing pattern choices of Chinese SOEs.