贿赂、腐败与银行信贷资源配置:审视正式制度的作用

Bribe,Corruption and Bank Credit Resources Allocation:Inspect the Role of Formal Institution

本文利用世界银行2012年关于中国企业的调查数据,旨在从实证角度研究贿赂等腐败活动与银行信贷资源配置之间的内在关系。并进一步探讨正式制度质量对这一内在关系的调节效应。研究发现,贿赂等腐败活动与银行信贷资源配置之间呈显著的倒U型曲线关系,并且正式制度质量会弱化贿赂等腐败活动与银行信贷资源配置之间的内在关系,这意味着随着正式制度质量的提升,贿赂等腐败活动对银行信贷资源配置的作用会逐步弱化,取而代之的便是市场机制的配置作用。

This paper provides a firm-level empirical analysis on the ways in which bribe affects bank credit resources allocation, and further study the moderating effect of formal institution on the internal relationship using survey data of World Bank about institutional quality of Chinese enterprise operation. This study finds that, there is an inverted U-shaped curve relationship between corruption and bank credit resources allocation. Furthermore, the quality of formal institution will weaken the internal relationship between corruption and bank credit resource allocation; it means that with for- mal institution quality improving, the effect of bribe on bank credit resource allocation will be gradu- ally weakening, and replaced by the role of market mechanism.