建设工程安全管理创新激励机制研究

Research on the Innovative Incentive Mechanism for the Safety Management

建筑行业是我国国民经济的支柱行业,但长期以来,建筑安全问题却不容乐观。近三年,全国房屋市政工程安全生产形势总体平稳,但较大事故起数和死亡人数呈上升趋势,安全保障显得十分脆弱。建筑安全事故频频发生的现象受安全效益特性、市场多方博弈及事故损失统计误差等多方面原因影响,而解决这一问题的较好途径之一是建立经济激励体制。通过对安全事故频发的产生以及已有经济激励体制的分析,提出与传统单惩罚性的保险机制不同的逆向保险激励机制,即安全事故发生时,投保的施工企业需支付赔偿金;安全事故未发生时,投保的施工企业可获得奖金。该创新机制选取了安全教育环节作为对象进行建模,分析表明该模型能使施工队伍流动化,能将安全教育产业化,并促进安全管理的自动化。

As a pillar industry of national economy,construction industry is suffering an increasing rate of construction accidents. Consequently,the security assurance becomes very tenuous. Many factors can influence the construction security accidents, including the features of safety effectiveness,multi-player game of the market and the statistical error of accidents. One of the main ways to solve this problem is building incentive mechanism. The traditional incentive mechanism uses punitive measures for safety management,but the innovative incentive mechanism proposes a reversal insurance system：construction enterprises have to pay the compensation when there is a security accident while it can earn the bonus otherwise. This incentive mechanism is applied in the process of safety education. It is proved to have a contribution to helping the construction corps become more flexible,industrializing the process of safety education,and achieving in the automation of safety management.