不对称信息下的住宅质量管理

Housing Quality Regulation under Asymmetric Information

住宅质量在买卖双方间存在严重的信息不对称,具有典型的信任品特征。分析住宅产品的信任品特征以及住宅市场上存在的处置不足、过度处置和过度取费三类质量欺诈,指出信息不对称问题是导致房地产开发企业缺乏保证或提高住宅质量激励的关键。国内对住宅质量管理的研究多从住宅建设过程切入,却一直未关注住宅质量的信任品特征对房地产开发企业质量保证的激励扭曲以及住宅质量管理制度选择的影响。结合住宅产品的信任品特征提出建立住宅质量信息披露制度是保证和提高住宅质量的重要途径。研究结论对完善我国住宅质量管理制度、减少住宅质量欺诈提供了重要参考。

Housing quality has a severe asymmetric information problem between consumers and sellers and exhibits typical feature of credence goods. This article analyzes the credence goods traits of housing and three kinds of quality frauds on housing market,which include overtreatment,undertreatment and overcharging. It points out that asymmetric information is the key that weakens incentives for real estate companies to ensure and enhance their product quality. Most researches on housing quality regulation in China have been developed from the point of housing construction process,yet oversees that the traits of credence goods of housing have seriously distorted the incentives for real estate companies to ensure housing quality and have an influential power over the selection of housing quality regulation policy. Based on the credence traits of housing,this article proposes that the housing quality information disclosure system is the key to ensure and to enhance housing quality. Policy suggestions in this article provide insights for housing quality regulation in China and help to lessen the quality fraud on housing market.