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Intermediate Spoofing Strategies and Countermeasures 被引量:7

Intermediate Spoofing Strategies and Countermeasures
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摘要 Intermediate spoofing can impact most off-the-shelf Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) receivers, therefore low cost detection of such spoofing is very important to protect the reliability of the GNSS receivers used in critical safety and financial applications. This paper presents two strategies to analyze attacks by intermediate spoofing attackers to identify the weaknesses of such attacks. The analyses lead to a code and carrier phase consistency detection method with simulation results showing that this method can indicate the receiver when spoofing has occurred. The method can be used by most receivers, is inexpensive, and requires only a small software upgrade. Intermediate spoofing can impact most off-the-shelf Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) receivers, therefore low cost detection of such spoofing is very important to protect the reliability of the GNSS receivers used in critical safety and financial applications. This paper presents two strategies to analyze attacks by intermediate spoofing attackers to identify the weaknesses of such attacks. The analyses lead to a code and carrier phase consistency detection method with simulation results showing that this method can indicate the receiver when spoofing has occurred. The method can be used by most receivers, is inexpensive, and requires only a small software upgrade.
出处 《Tsinghua Science and Technology》 SCIE EI CAS 2013年第6期599-605,共7页 清华大学学报(自然科学版(英文版)
基金 National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.61101070)
关键词 intermediate spoofing dragging code phase strategy low cost countermeasures code and carrierphase consistency intermediate spoofing dragging code phase strategy low cost countermeasures code and carrierphase consistency
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参考文献12

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