摘要
推广正式保险往往被认为能够增加目标人群的福利。然而,本文在理论上证明,在异质性风险下,正式保险的引入常常会使得风险覆盖度变小而降低福利。这是因为先前存在的非正式风险分担机制可能会被过度挤出。为了避免实际中保险被引入的内生性问题,我们设计了一个实验来研究挤出效应和福利变化。我们观察到明显的挤出效应,但并不存在如理论所预测的过度挤出和风险覆盖率下降。然而,我们也发现挤出效应的大小和收入差距相关。收入差距过大会导致挤出过大而风险覆盖率不变。这使得引入正式保险的政策并没有产生预期的效果。这些发现为政策制定提供了一定的依据。
An important issue with promoting formal insurance in the developing countries that has been previ- ously ignored is the interaction between formal insurance and preexisting informal risk sharing arrangements. This paper shows, in theory, that introducing formal insurance to the underdeveloped areas often leads to a low- er degree of total coverage of heterogeneous risk, because formal insurance often crowds out preexisting informal risk -sharing arrangements in a more than one -for- one manner. Our laboratory experiment suggests that the crowding- out effect exists, but it is not more than one -for- one. However, we find that income inequality leads to larger crowding - out effect that significantly limits the positive welfare impact of introducing formal in- surance.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期125-138,共14页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金(No.70903003和No.71073002)
国家自然科学基金(No.71103003)
教育部人文社科基金(13YJA790064)的资助
北京高等学校青年英才计划(YETP0040)的资助
“数量经济与数理金融教育部重点实验室(北京大学)”对本研究的支持
关键词
非正式风险分担
正式保险
挤出效应
Informal risk-sharing mechanisms, Insurance, Crowding-out effect