在线零售商交货期压缩投入与制造商投入补偿决策

Lead Time Investment of On-line Retailers and Manufacturers' Compensation

投入大量资金以压缩交货期已成为在线零售商获取竞争优势的重要手段。基于Stackberg博弈构建在线零售商交货期压缩投入和制造商投入补偿决策模型,分析顾客需求对支付的敏感性、投入效果系数、压缩前的顾客等待时间成本等要素对决策的影响。研究表明,制造商给予补偿优于无补偿的情形,不仅可以激励在线零售商的交货期压缩投入,而且增加了双方的利润以及供应链总利润。最后,本文通过构建两部定价合同来协调在线零售商的交货期压缩投入和制造商的投入补偿行为,并通过算例对模型的结论进行了验证。

Based on Stackberg game, on-line retailers＇ lead time investment model and manufacturers＇ compensation model are established. The impact of customer waiting cost before lead time compression, demand sensitivity of payment, investment effect is analyzed. The results show that investment compensation strategy is better than non-compensation. A two-part tariff contract is designed to coordinate the decisions of the manufacturers and retailers.