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商业银行的囚徒困境——基于博弈论视角的利率市场化分析 被引量:3

Prisoner's Dilemma of Commercial Banks —— Analysis on Market-Oriented Interest Rate Based on Game Theory
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摘要 随着贷款利率解除管制,我国的利率市场化改革仅余存款利率上限管制,这意味着利率的完全市场化时代即将来临。从博弈论角度来看,商业银行在利率市场化之后将陷入囚徒困境,这将使以存贷款业务为主的商业银行竞争加剧。在此竞局中,商业银行采取何种竞争策略不仅与博弈对手有关,还与利率市场化之后的宏观经济环境有关。为了避免或减缓因商业银行间过度竞争而导致的金融不稳定,政策上需要把握利率完全市场化的时机,完善相关的制度建设。 With deregulation of the loan interest rate, there only exits cap regulation of deposit rate in China's interest market, which means the era of fully market-oriented interest rates approaching. From the perspective of game theory, market-oriented interest rate will bring commercial banks into a dilemma and a hotter competition, whose main businesses are deposit and loan. What strategies commercial banks should take depend on not only the major competitors but also the macro economic environment after the market-oriented interest reform. In order to avoid or reduce the financial instability caused by the excessive competition among commercial banks, we should seize the opportunity to carry fully market-oriented interest reform, and perfect the relevant system construction.
作者 张伟
出处 《天津商务职业学院学报》 2014年第1期37-42,共6页 Journal of Tianjin College of Commerce
关键词 利率市场化 商业银行 囚徒困境 策略选择 market-oriented interest rate commercial bank prisoner's dilemma strategiesselecting
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