摘要
文章运用演化博弈的思想,以产业生态系统中存在共生关系的企业群体为博弈主体,构建机会主义和惩罚机制2种情形下博弈主体的支付矩阵;以企业与监管方为博弈主体,构建不同策略下参与主体双方的支付矩阵;建立相应的复制动态方程,寻求演化稳定策略,通过分析得出影响因素对产业共生行为策略演化初始状态的作用机理。
Based on the approach of evolutionary game ,taking the enterprise groups in the industrial e-cosystem w hich are in a relationship of commensalism as game subjects ,the payment functions of the main parties involved under opportunism and punishment mechanism are proposed .Taking the enter-prise and supervisor as game subjects ,the payment function of the parties under different strategies is constructed .T he corresponding replicator dynamic equation is established ,and the evolutionary stable strategy is discussed .T hrough the analysis of the model ,the mechanism of the influence factors act-ing on the initial state of the industrial commensalism behavior strategy evolution is obtained .
出处
《合肥工业大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第2期232-237,共6页
Journal of Hefei University of Technology:Natural Science
基金
高等学校博士学科点专项科研(新教师)基金资助项目(20100111120021)
关键词
演化博弈
产业共生
复制动态方程
演化稳定策略
evolutionary game
industrial commensalism
replicator dynamic equation
evolutionary stable strategy