摘要
笔者分别描述了无外部收益和有外部收益的金融融资租赁业务联盟合作的一般博弈过程,通过构建不存在外部收益的融资租赁博弈模型和存在外部效益的融资租赁合作博弈模型以及对联盟合作临界条件的求解,对融资租赁业务的联盟合作方式进行有效性分析。结果显示在不考虑外部收益的情况下,委托其他租赁公司完成并支付固定金额的费用模式更容易实现;相反,在考虑外部收益的情形下,双方博弈的结果是选择合作,共同完成项目。
This research intensively explores the effectiveness of finance lease strategic alliances by construc- ting two game theory models, basic model and external income model. Business modes of financial lease companies are divided into independent modes and cooperative modes. Then the cooperative modes can be divided into two: entrusting other financial lease company at the cost of administration expense, or cooperating by sharing the income. The result shows that, in the basic model, mode one is more feasible. While in the external income model, mode two is more feasible and provides extra benefits to both players.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第3期55-60,共6页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
金融租赁公司
战略联盟
博弈模型
有效性分析
Strategic alliance
Finance lease company
Game model
Effectiveness analysis