单位成本不对称时的进入与许可策略

Entry and Licensing Policies under Unit Cost Asymmetry

针对一个在位企业和两个潜在进入企业 ,研究成本不对称时各个企业的进入或技术许可策略。潜在进入者可以开发出劣等的替代技术而与在位企业进行竞争。用替代技术生产同质产品的单位成本比用在位企业的技术高。文中考虑了 4种情况下在位者与进入者的策略 ,并对其进行了分析对比 :( 1 )没有许可 ;( 2 )事后许可 ;( 3)进入者实行合资研究以对抗在位者的事后许可策略 ;( 4 )事前许可。

This paper studies entry and licensing policies for an incumbent monopoly and two potential entrants under unit cost asymmetry. The potential entrants can enter the market and compete with the incumbent by developing an alternative, but inferior, technology. The unit cost of homogeneous products under the substitute technology is higher than that under the incumbent's technology. Policies for the incumbent and the entrants are studied and compared with each other under the following four situations: (1) no licensing ; (2) ex post licensing; (3) a research joint venture of the potential entrants against ex post licensing; (4) ex ante licensing.