竞争性行业中央企业利润最优上交比例:内部代理成本与外部融资成本的权衡

The Optimal Percentage of Central Enterprises' Profits Paid to the State:Balance between Internal Agency Cost and External Transaction Cost

本文首先构建了一个关于一般竞争性行业国有企业利润最优上交比例的理论模型:对于那些企业投资回报高于社会平均资本成本的国有企业,国有资产监督管理委员会(以下简称国资委)在考虑其利润分配时要权衡两方面成本:一是因利润上交而导致的企业对外融资的交易成本:二是因利润留存于企业而可能被经营层侵蚀的内部代理成本,而利润最优分配应使上述两方面成本之和最小。本文基于一般竞争性行业的62家中央企业数据展开计量分析,并对近几年这些企业的利润最优上交比例进行了估算。结果表明,从近几年中央企业经营数据看,国资委及社会对中央企业的外部监督较为有效,而就其中的净资产回报率高于平均社会资本成本的40家企业而言,由于利润回报率水平普遍较高,同时企业外部融资的交易成本又较高,故这些企业绝大多数其利润应全部留存。因此,若要利用国有经济支持公共福利,主要依赖的不应是竞争性行业的绩优国有企业,而应是垄断性国有企业与竞争性行业中企业投资回报低于社会平均资本成本的国有企业的利润上交,以及对后一类竞争性国有企业的股权减持。

Firstly this paper built a theoretical model about the optimal percentage of SOEs＇ profits paid to the state. The model implied that SASAC would trade off two aspects of cost when considering the profit distribution of those SOEs which investment returns are higher than the average capital cost： one is transaction costs of firms＇ external financing arising from the profit delivery, another is internal agency costs because of erosion of retained earnings by the management, and the optimal distribution of profits should minimize the two aspects of costs. Then this paper used data of 62 central enterprises in competitive industries to make econometric analysis, and calculated the optimal percentage of those SOEs＇ profits paid to the state in recent years. The results show that, from the data of central enterprises in recent years, the SASAC and the society＇s external supervision of central enterprises has been effective. Of most of those 40 SOEs which investment returns are higher than the average capital cost, profits should be retained, because in recent years these SOEs achieve a high profit rate and transaction cost of external financing is too high for them. Therefore, if we make use of the state-owned economy to support public welfare, the main dependence should not be leading SOEs in competitive industries, but should be profit delivery of the monopolistic SOEs and those SOEs in competitive industries which investment returns are lower than the average capital cost, and reduction of state-owned shares in the latter competitive SOEs.