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承销商变更、声誉机制与IPO机会 被引量:1

Underwriter Reputation and IPO Opportunity: A Perspective of Underwriter Switching
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摘要 承销商作为股票市场重要的金融中介,其作用在2004年保荐制实施后得到凸显。选取2004年1月至2012年7月再次上会的发行申请为研究样本,建立Logistic回归模型,并实证检验更换承销商对发行人获得IPO机会的影响。实证结果表明,再次上会更换为高声誉承销商与发行申请时通过IPO审核呈正相关关系,并在1%的水平下显著,即再次上会更换为高声誉承销商的发行申请更容易得到IPO机会。 Underwriter plays an important role in stock market, especially after Sponsor System implemented in 2004. Taking applicants who reapplied for IPO from January 2004 to July 2012 as sample, Logistic regression model was constructed to examine whether underwriter switching affects IPO opportunity or not. It turns out underwriter switching has a positive correlation with IPO permission, when the level is below 1%, which implies that switching to higher reputation underwriters is more helpful with accessing to IPO opportunity.
出处 《安徽工业大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2014年第1期85-88,共4页 Journal of Anhui University of Technology(Natural Science)
基金 国家社科基金项目(10CJL022 11BJL019) 安徽省社科规划项目(AHSK11-12D71) 安徽省教育厅人文社科重点研究基地重点项目(2011sk730zd)
关键词 承销商变更 声誉机制 IPO机会 再次上会 Underwriter switching Reputation IPO opportunity Reapply for IPO
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  • 1Levin, J. Relational Incentive Contracts. The American Economic Review,2003.
  • 2Baker, G, Gibbons, R, and Murphy, K,J. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firms. The Quarterly of Economics,2002.
  • 3MacLeod, B, and Malcomson, J. Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility,and Involuntary Unemployment. Econometrica, 1989.
  • 4Plambeck,E L,and Taylor,T A. Partnership in a Dynamic Production System with Unobservable Actions and Non contractible out put. Manageme-Nt Science,2006.

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