评戴维森和金在权关于非则一元论的争论

A Comment on the Debate of Anomalous Monism between Davidson and Kim

戴维森的非则一元论基于三个前提即心理-物理因果相互作用原则、因果特征的律则性原则和心理-物理的非则论原则。前两个原则所谈的对象是个别事件或个体,后一原则所谈的对象是一类事件或性质。这三个原则合起来断言,单个心理事件可以还原为物理事件,但一类心理事件或者心理性质不能还原为物理性质。因此,非则一元论又叫做"非还原的物理主义"。金在权着重从两个方面批评非则一元论:其一是指出它的非则性论点将导致心理性质失去因果效力,从而沦为副现象论;其二是指出严格规律和非严格规律区分的相对性,这使它难以避免向还原论回归。

Davidson＇s anomalous monism is based on three premises： The Principle of Causal Interaction, the Principle of the Nomologieal of Causality and the Principle Anomalism of the Mental. The first two principles only refer to particular events or individuals, while the last principle refers to types of events or properties. These three principles assert all together that a single mental event can he reduced to a physical event, while a type of mental events or a mental property cannot be reduced to a physical property. So anomalous monism is also called ＂Nonreductive physicalism＂. Kim criticizes anomalous monism mainly from two aspects： Firstly, its anomalous thesis would lead mental properties to lose their causal efficacy and become epiphenomenalism. Secondly, the difference between strict laws and nonstrict laws is relative, and this would make it hard to refrain from becoming reductionism.