当代信念伦理学的“第四条道路”--论皮尔士的信念规范理论

The Fourth Way of Contemporary Ethics of Belief:On Peirce's Doctrine of Belief Norm

皮尔士认为信念的对象是命题,信念表现了当事人进行特定行动的倾向。人们为了消除怀疑,意图通过探究来确定信念。一个信念是应当持有的,当且仅当它能够免除怀疑。通过与固执方法、权威方法和先天方法的比较,皮尔士认为科学方法是唯一正确的方法,进而持有信念规范主张:一个信念是应当持有的,当且仅当它是通过科学方法得到的。当代信念伦理学的证据主义、实用主义和兼容主义都面临着理论困境,而皮尔士的外在主义走出了"第四条道路"。出于科学方法的实在性、普遍性与可操作性,皮尔士的主张能够解答普遍性问题。

Peirce regarded propositions as the objects of beliefs. Beliefs show the disposition to specific behaviours. In order to remove doubts, people intend to fix their beliefs by investigation. Peirce indicated that beliefs ought to be held, iff it might remove any doubt. By comparing the tenacity method,the authority method with the apriori method, Peirce regarded scientific methods as the only correct, and thus proposed the thesis of belief norm—'a belief ought to be held, iff it is acquired by scientific methods'. The main approaches of contemporary ethics of belief such as Evidentialism, Pragmaticism and Compatibilism are confronted with some theoretical difficulties, while Peirce's externalism shows the fourth way. On reality, generality and operationality of scientific methods, generality problem can be solved by Peirce's doctrine.