摘要
传统的真之符合论面临一个问题:由谁来判别一个命题是否符合事实?为从"上帝之眼"回归人类之眼,普特南提出内在实在论,以区别于外在实在论。这里进而提出关于"真"的内在符合论,以区别于传统的外在符合论;其关键在于把事实看作语言性的,并将语言性事实的观点分为外延等同论和内涵等同论。从主观性和客观性的角度看,内涵等同论和外在符合论处于两个极端,而外延等同论和内在符合论则处于中道,并且是二位一体的。在哲学史上,这两种符合论和两种等同论的要素贯穿于弗雷格、罗素、塔斯基和普特南等人的"真"理论之中。
The traditional correspondence theory faces a problem: who should judge whether a proposition corresponds to facts? In order to return to human eyes from God's eyes, Putnam proposes internal realism to differentiate from external realism. I shall propose internal correspondence theory of truth to differentiate from external one, whose key is to regard facts as linguistic and to divide the view of linguistic facts into extensional identity theory and intensional one. From the angles of subjectivity and objectivity, intensional identity theory and external correspondence theory lie at both ends respectively,while extensional identity theory and internal correspondence theory lie in intermediate positions and combine into one. In the history of philosophy, the factors of these correspondence theories and identity theories permeate the theories of truth of Frege, Russell, Tarski and Putnam.
出处
《哲学分析》
2014年第1期118-130,199,共13页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
国家社科基金项目(项目编号:10BZX020)
广东省社会科学"十一五"规划项目(项目编号:09C-01)
广东省高校人文社科基地重大项目(项目编号:10JDXM72001)的资助
关键词
真
符合论
等同论
实在论
语言性事实
truth
correspondence theory
identity theory
realism
linguistic fact