期刊文献+

机动车保险市场信息不对称分析——来自山东、湖北、四川的经验证据

Analysis of Asymmetric Information in Motor Insurance Market: Empirical Evidence from Shandong,Hubei and Sichuan Province
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摘要 运用中国某大型财产保险公司山东、湖北、四川三省机动车保险的承保和理赔数据,通过建立probit模型和bivariate probit模型实证检验了中国机动车保险市场信息不对称。研究发现,中国机动车保险市场存在显著的信息不对称,且在险种和地区分布上不平衡。随着索赔次数的增加,信息不对称的险种差异仍然存在,但地区差异渐趋消失。同时,投保人在商业第三者责任保险赔偿限额的选择上存在显著的正向选择。最后,对保险公司如何应对信息不对称提出了一些政策建议。 This paper uses the underwriting and claims data of Shandong, Hubei and Sichuan of a certain big property & casualty insurance company in China to test asymmetric information in the motor insurance market through a pair of probit models and a bivariate probit model. The results indicate that significant asymmetric information exists in motor insurance market in China and the distributions of the asymmetry are unbalanced both in different lines and regions. Moreover, with the increase of loss frequency, the differences in regions disappear whilst the differences in lines still exist. There also exists obvious advantageous selection in the choices of limits of indemnity of third party liability insurance. Finally several countermeasures are proposed for insurance companies to avoid asymmetric information.
作者 刘颖 任燕燕
出处 《统计与信息论坛》 CSSCI 2014年第2期94-100,共7页 Journal of Statistics and Information
基金 山东省社会科学规划项目<山东省保险市场信息不对称的检验与对策研究>(12CJRJ08) 山东大学自主创新基金<中国保险市场信息不对称的实证检验>(IFW12046)
关键词 机动车保险 信息不对称 逆向选择 道德风险 motor insurance asymmetric information adverse selection moral hazard
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参考文献19

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二级参考文献37

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