债务期限结构、管理层防御效应与上市公司高管薪酬水平

Debt Maturity Structure,Managerial Entrenchment Effect and Managerial Compensation Level in Chinese Listed Firms

以债务期限结构为权衡指标,以我国深沪两市2003-2011年上市的588家公司为样本,实证研究我国上市公司债务期限结构与高管薪酬的关系。结果表明:我国上市公司管理层存在着利用手中的权力在延长债务期限的同时提高自身薪酬的管理层防御行为;与国有企业相比,非国有企业的管理层防御效应可能更严重;总经理兼任董事长的企业管理层防御效应较不兼任的更严重。

Using debt maturity structure as a measurement norm and the 2003 -2011 data of China＇s 588 listed corpora- tions as samples, this paper analyzes the relationship between debt maturity structure and executives＇ salaries of listed compa- nies in China. The results show ： （ 1 ） the management of Chinese listed companies may use their power to extend debt maturity and improve their remuneration at the same time; （2） compared with state-owned enterprises, the non-state-owned enterprises are more serious in their managerial entrenchment ; （3） the managerial entrenchment is also more severe in companies of man- ager-chairman duality. Thus the improvement of executive incentive and payout policy should take the managerial entrench- ment into full consideration.