摘要
清代洞庭湖等水域频繁出现河盗猖獗现象,清政府亦多有治理河盗的制度,但治理效果有时显著,有时则不仅无效而且有害,显示制度受到人为因素的影响较大,制度本身往往亦多互相冲突之处,均抑制了治理效果。实际表现为应对突发性盗案的高效严密与日常防御的疏漏百出;地方治效与否取决于官吏的个人能力和品质;弭盗举措经常是兴一政则生一弊;在弭盗上存在地域协调、文武协作难题等。
Qing Dynasty, river pirates were rampant in Dingting Lake and neighboring government decreed pirate-control systems, their effects are not constant, sometime even waters. Thought the harmful. This shows official's personal influences on the system and the conflicts between the system rules which limited the effect. Such dilemmas are embodied in the high-efficiency of the system in fighting robbery emergency and low-efficiency in daily precaution; the dependence of pirate-control on the official's personal Capability and morality; the accompanying goods and evils of pirate-control initiatives; and the difficulties in inter-regional coordination and civil-martial coordination.
出处
《井冈山大学学报(社会科学版)》
2014年第1期114-123,共10页
Journal of Jinggangshan University(Social Sciences)
基金
国家社科基金项目"明清河海盗的生成及其治理研究"(项目编号:12BZSO84)
关键词
抢米案
河盗治理
制度困境
rice robbery
river pirate control
systemic dilemma