摘要
我国IPO公司在招股书中披露的大股东控制风险会影响投资者对发行新股的估值。本文选取2007-2011年中小板IPO公司数据,检验了IPO公司股权结构对新股发行定价的影响,发现IPO公司股票估值和终极控股股东的现金流权成正比,和控制权与现金流权的偏离度成反比;IPO抑价程度与控制权和现金流权的偏离度成反比。研究结论说明IPO公司大股东控制的股权结构特征能够起到信号传递效应,会影响投资者对新股发行的估值,IPO公司终极控股股东会主导公司在IPO中进行高定价以获取更多资源,为上市后对公司进行利益侵占做准备。
The large shareholder control risk disclosed in the prospectus by IPO companies will affect the valuation of new shares. This paper selects the data of SME companies listed during 2007-2011 and empirically test the relationship between the IPO valuation and ownership structure controlled by large shareholders. The results show that the IPO valuation is positively affected by cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder, and negatively affected by the deviation between the voting and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder. The degree to which IPO is underpriced is inversely proportional to the degree to which the voting right deviates from the cash flow right. Our analysis indicates that outside shareholders incorporate the corporate governance risk of potential expropriation by entrenched large shareholders in valuing and the ultimate controlling shareholders tend to encourage high IPO valuation in order to get more resources to prepare for future expropriation.
出处
《管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期13-23,共11页
Management Review
基金
黑龙江自然科学基金面上项目(G201107)
山东省软科学研究计划项目(2013RKA10001)
山东省高校科技计划项目(2010RKGB1121)
关键词
大股东控制风险
IPO定价
现金流权
控制权和现金流权的偏离
large shareholder control risk, IPO valuation, cash flow right, deviation of voting right from cash flow right