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现金分红的连续性、投资效率与公司价值——基于面板结构VAR模型的实证分析 被引量:16

Continuous Payment of Cash Dividend,Investment Efficiency and Corporate Value ——PSVAR Model-based Empirical Research
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摘要 本文以1998-2009年间我国1383家上市公司为样本,分别按最终控制人的性质和派现行为是否连续对样本进行了划分,运用面板的结构VAR模型研究了现金股利、投资效率和公司价值之间的关系。基于模型的脉冲响应函数和方差分解,本文对连续派现的公司和非连续派现的公司进行了比较。研究发现:自然人控制的上市公司中,非连续派现公司的投资挤占了现金股利的积极效应,并给公司价值带来了负的冲击效应,连续派现公司的现金分红与投资存在相互促进的效应,公司价值对投资冲击的响应函数值为正;地方政府控制的上市公司整体上投资对现金分红冲击的响应函数值为负,其对公司价值的冲击效应也为负;中央政府控制的上市公司中,连续派现公司的现金分红具有抑制过度投资的效应,但其对投资波动的影响作用较小,若对非连续派现的公司实施以分红为条件的融资政策,则可能会制约其发展。 Based on the dataset of 1353 listed companies structural vector auto-regressive mode investment efficiency and corporate va is established to ue by classifying from 1998 to2009 in China in this paper, a panel analysis the relationship between cash-dividend, the sample according to economic nature of ulti- mate controller and whether payment is continuous. The impulse response function and variance decompo- sition for continuous-payment companies and discontinuous-payment companies reflect the following re- sults. As to the private company, the investment occupies the positively effect of the cash dividend and bring about the negative cumulative impulse in discontinuous payment companies while the opposite is true in continuous-payment companies. The response function value of investment to the impulse of cash divi- dend and impulse of investment to corporate value are all negative in the whole local government controlled companies. Although the continuous-payment curb the overinvestment in the central government con- trolled companies, that has little effect on investment variance. If discontinuous-payment companies con- trolled by central government are implemented financing policy for conditions of paying cash dividend, they will be limited to develop.
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第3期103-114,共12页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71173078)
关键词 现金分红 投资效率 公司价值 面板结构VAR cash dividend investment efficiency ~ corporate value panel structural VAR
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