期刊文献+

国有(控股)上市公司经理层激励机制的创新——股票期权计划的应用分析

The Innovation of Managerial Incentive Mechanism in Listed and State-owned (Share-controlling) Companies ——An Analysis to the Application of Stock Option Plan
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摘要 试用委托—代理理论对国有上市公司实行股票期权计划进行分析 ,以完善国有上市公司对经理层的激励约束机制。 Analysis is given to the application of stock option plan (SOP) in state owned companies in terms of agency theory as an attempt to improve the current incentive control system.
作者 史艳华
出处 《淮海工学院学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2000年第4期69-72,共4页 Journal of Huaihai Institute of Technology:Natural Sciences Edition
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参考文献4

  • 1Defuso Richard A,Thomad S Zorn,Robert R Johnson.The association between executive stock option changes and managerial decision making[].Financial Management.1991
  • 2Jensen,Michael C,Kevin J Murphy.Performance pay and top-management incentives[].Journal of Politics.1990
  • 3Lewellen,Wibur G,Claudio Loderer,et al.Executive compensation and executive problems:an empirical analysis[].Journal of Accountancy.1987
  • 4Haugen,Robert A,Lemma W Senbet.Resolving the agency problems of external capital through options[].The Journal of Finance.1981

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