内幕交易民事责任的价值平衡与规则互补——以美国为研究范本

The Equilibrium Values and Complementary Rules of Civil Liability of Insider Trading——Based on the Model of American Legal Regimes

内幕交易的民事赔偿责任不同于普通的侵权责任。如何应对内幕交易的民事诉讼、是否应对该类诉讼进行适当限制是各国制度建构所面对的共同问题,在此方面,美国的经验具有重要的借鉴意义。在内幕交易民事责任的追究中,存在着远非单一的多元价值,补偿投资者利益只是要实现的若干目标之一。制度构建的重要任务是要对相互冲突的价值目标进行恰当的协调和平衡,其中包括:威慑、监控内幕交易行为、保护投资者信心与防止滥诉、保护公司利益之间的平衡;补偿投资者损失与防止民事责任成为投资者保险之间的平衡;保护受害者诉讼权利与抑制过度诉讼之间的平衡等。同时,为实现法律的目标,内幕交易民事赔偿的各种法律规则之间需要功能的互补和相互的配合,包括刑事、行政、民事责任的互补配合,程序法和实体法的互补配合等。

The civil liability of insider trading is different from the common tort liability. It is a problem shared by every legal regime of how to regulate and whether to impose restriction on civil lawsuits of insider trading. In this respect, the experience of U. S. is worthy of consideration as a developed model. There are multiple values protected in the tracing of civil liability of insider trading, among which interest compensation of investors is only one of those. The purpose of institutional construction is to coordinate and balance various targets of conflicting values, which includes ： the balance between the deterrence of insider trading which protects the confidence of investors and the prevention of harassment litigation which protects the interests of corporations; the balance between compensating the loss of investors and preventing the civil liability from being insurances for investors; the balance between protecting the litigation rights of victims and prohibiting vexatious litigations. Meanwhile, the rules of civil liability of insider trading need to be functionally complementary and mutually supportive to achieve the legal targets, including a balanced approach between the criminal liability, administrative liability and civil liability, and between the procedural laws and substantive laws.