集体行动、政治竞争与发展的障碍——基于新政治经济学的视角被引量：3

Collective Action,Political Competition and the Barriers to Development

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摘要本文在无限期界、内生化政治竞争中考察了经济发展条件的改善使利益集团面临权衡的思想:既提高利益集团掌握政治权力时的收益,也可能降低其掌权概率;刻画了利益集团阻止经济发展条件改善的条件。分析表明:(1)无论经济发展条件是否得到改善,利益集团都会增大对政治权力投资,导致经济绩效下降;(2)经济增长与利益集团面临的政治挑战同向变化;(3)社会不稳定和劳动密集型经济会强化利益集团阻止经济发展条件的改善的动力。最后是相关改革建议和未来研究方向。 This paper establishes an endogenous model of political competition to investi- gate the idea that improvement of economic development preconditions confront interest group with a trade-off when it can raise the citizens＇ ability ofcollective action and thus decreases the interest group＇s probability of being in power. Firstly, the interest group may prevent the im- provement of economic development preconditions. Secondly, whether improvement of eco- nomic development conditions does happen, the interest group may increase the investment on political power. Finally, economic growth makes the interest groups facing more serious po- litical challenges. At the end some reform measures are suggested.

作者魏福成邹薇马文涛

机构地区中南财经政法大学财政税务学院武汉大学经济与管理学院西安交通大学经济与金融学院

出处《经济学（季刊）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第1期601-624,共24页 China Economic Quarterly

基金中南财经政法大学中央高校基本科研业务费(2013016) 国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(011&ZD006) 国家社会科学基金重点项目(010AZD013) 国家自然科学基金青年项目(71203175)的资助

关键词发展的障碍利益集团政治竞争

分类号 F0 [经济管理—政治经济学]

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