摘要
对危险品运输安全-效益优化问题进行了研究,基于委托-代理理论,建立了在委托人对运输安全具有完全明辨性的进度激励-安全控制决策的博弈模型,分析了双方实现各自利益最大化的最优策略,即委托人确定合理的危险品提前运达效益的分配系数、运输安全保证率水平及委托人对运输各环节安全的检测水平,以及承运人在上述条件下,确定合理的进度加快投入的努力与安全控制的水平,进而可为危险品运输委托人与承运人之间的最优运费确定提供依据;文章的最后进行实例应用分析.
Security-Benefit optimization Problem of hazardous materials transportation is studied in this paper,based on the principal-agent theory,under the conditions of principal complete determinately on transportation security,a game model with schedule incentive and security control is built,the optimum strategy that both benefits between owner and contractor are maximized is analyzed,That is,principal fixes the reasonable partition of arrival in advance benefits,the transportation security＇s control level and the security detection level,under these conditions,the carrier defines the suitable level of accelerating transportation and security control level.Moreover,it provides a support for making an optimum freight; Finally,application analysis is taken.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2014年第4期97-103,共7页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
基金
中国民航大学青年教师基金(2010QD093)
关键词
危险品运输
优化决策
安全
效益
hazardous materials transportation
optimization decision
security
benefit
