分析师关注对上市公司高管薪酬粘性的影响研究

Study on the Impact of Analyst Coverage on Executive Compensation Stickiness in Listed Companies

本文研究了分析师关注对上市公司高管薪酬粘性的影响,发现在中国,分析师关注能够显著降低高管薪酬粘性;进一步按照地区分组测试的结果显示,分析师关注对高管薪酬粘性的抑制作用在中西部地区比东部地区更加显著。本文与以往研究的不同之处在于增进了关于资本市场的机制安排影响高管薪酬粘性的理解。

This article studies on the relationship between analyst coverage and the stickiness of executive compensation, the results show that analyst coverage constrains executive compensation stickiness significantly in China, further group study suggests that the constrain effect is more significant in companies located in central and western regions than that in eastern regions. This article provides incremental comprehension on the impact of capital market on executive compensation stickiness which is different from other previous studies.