网络位置、公司控制权与管理层薪酬激励

Network Location,Corporate Control Power and Management Compensation Sensitivity

董事网络是同时在两家及以上公司担任职务的连锁董事形成的集合,董事在董事网络中的位置能够影响其治理效果。本文利用社会网络分析方法,实证检验了董事的网络位置与管理层薪酬及其激励有效性的关系,研究发现:公司董事网络中心度会显著增强管理层薪酬及其业绩敏感性;进一步研究显示,不同公司控制权背景会对董事网络的治理效果产生干扰。

Board network is a set system constructed by interlocking directorates who hold a post with two or more listed companies and the network location can affect the governance role of directors in China. Based on the resource dependent theo- ry, we use social network analysis methods for an empirical test on the relationship between directors＇ network location and the management compensation sensitivity. It is found that board network centrality can significantly enhance the management com- pensation sensitivity. Further study shows that this effect can he subject to the interference of corporate control power.