控股股东市场择时行为研究

A Study of Market Timing from the Perspective of Controlling Shareholders

借鉴Polk和Sapienza(2009)的方法将可操控性应计利润作为市场时机的衡量指标,研究资本市场有效程度低和公司股权结构集中情况下市场时机和股权再融资相互作用的内生关系,研究结果表明公司股权再融资过程中控股股东有强烈动机操纵盈余影响股价以创造股权再融资的市场时机并进行择时融资。另外,控股股东属性及两权分离程度也对股权再融资过程中盈余管理行为和择时行为产生影响。

Learning from Polk and Sapienza（2009）, this paper makes discretionary accruals as the indicator of market timing, and studies the endogenous relationship between market timing and seasoned equity offerings under the circum- stance of low efficiency in capital market and highly concentrated ownership structure of China listed companies. We find that the controlling shareholders have a strong motivation to use earnings management to temporarily manipulate stock prices and time their offerings to follow high stock prices around seasoned equity offerings. We also find that the property of the controlling shareholder, as well as the degree of divergence of control rights from cash flow rights, affects earnings management and market timing during seasoned equity offerings.