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从道德风险看激励性保险契约的设计——基于机动车第三者责任保险的检验 被引量:1

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摘要 以机动车第三者责任保险为例,通过被保险人赔偿限额的选择控制了其风险异质性、分离了信息不对称中的逆向选择,来专门研究道德风险问题。利用logit回归模型通过考察被保险人的风险频率与"不计免赔率特约险"的选择之间的条件相关关系,发现我国机动车保险市场存在道德风险,且免赔额条款能够显著降低被保险人的风险频率,有鉴于此,保险公司应该设计激励性保险契约以最大限度地鼓励被保险人积极防灾防损。
作者 刘颖 任燕燕
出处 《东岳论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第2期39-44,共6页 DongYue Tribune
基金 山东省社会科学规划项目"山东省保险市场信息不对称的检验与对策研究"(12CJRJ08) 山东大学自主创新基金"中国保险市场信息不对称的实证检验"(IFW12046)
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参考文献21

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二级参考文献58

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