集团控制、融资优势与投资效率

Group Control,Financing Advantages and Investment Efficiency

本文在企业组织理论与投融资理论相融合的统一分析框架下,从集团融资及其对投资效率的影响这一路径考察了集团控制及其内部资本市场运作对成员企业资源配置效率的影响。以A股上市公司2007—2010年的数据为样本,我们发现:集团化运作能通过多种途径放松成员企业的融资约束;而集团控制所带来的融资优势对成员企业投资效率的影响具有两面性。一方面会因资金来源的增加而缓解投资不足,另一方面却因整体融资能力的增强而加剧过度投资。进一步分析显示,产权异质性对集团资源配置效率有重要的影响。集团化运作的融资优势在私有产权控制的集团公司中得到最大发挥,具体表现为缓解投资不足;而地方政府控制的集团公司则容易利用低成本融资进行过度投资;中央政府控制的集团公司融资优势不明显,过度投资程度也较轻。上述研究结论将有助于我们全面深入的理解企业集团的"光明面"与"黑暗面"。

Capital allocation efficiency among enterprises has been distorted because of the impedection of external capital market and the lack of investor protection.On the one hand,enterprises generally face financing constraints due to information asymmetry.On the other hand,agents tend to over-invest in projects which have negative net present value in order to realize private benefits of control due to agency problems.How to effectively allocate funds has become an important issue for group＇s internal capital market.Our paper tries to address the following questions on whether：（1） group＇s internal capital markets could alleviate financing constraints of the member firms,（2） the relaxation of financing constraints and the access to credit resources could improve the investment efficiency,and （3） different natures of property rights have different impact on those above issues.Understanding answers to these questions can provide us not only with a deeper understanding of the ＂ bright side ＂ and ＂ dark side＂ of business groups,but also the evidence of the effectiveness of resource allocations of group internal capital market for emerging countries in transition.Under the unified analytical frame for the integration of enterprise organization theory and investment and financing theory,this paper investigates the effect of group control and the influence of its internal capital markets on resource allocation efficiency of member companies.Based on the data collected about A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2010,we derive three findings.Firstly,the group operation can relax the financing constraints of member companies through a variety of ways.Compared with independent enterprises,listed companies affiliated with groups have more non-bank loans,bank loans,and a higher asset-liability ratio.Secondly,financing advantages of group operation exist in three different properties-holding listed companies.The degree of group companies controlled by private property rights is greater than that controlled by local governments.In addition,the degree of group companies controlled by local governments is greater than that controlled by central government.The degree of difference is decided by their different initialendowment and development path.Thirdly,the group control and finance advantage have two-sided effect on investment efficiency of member companies.Compared with independent enterprises,listed companies affiliated with groups can alleviate the under-investment due to the increasing funding sources,but also aggravate the over-investment because of the enhancement of the overall financing capacity.Fourthly,the heterogeneity of property rights has an important implication on investment efficiency of business groups.Compared with independent enterprises,financing advantages maximize performance in the group companies,controlled by central government and private property rights,and by alleviating the under-investment.However,local government-controlled group companies tend to overinvest in low-cost financing property.These findings enrich not only enterprise organization theory and corporate finance theory,but also raise the concerns of regulatory authorities about credit resource allocation efficiency.They should also expose the group black box and observe the flow of credit funds and efficiency.This paper suggests that state-owned banks should establish and improve the credit management system.