期刊文献+

基于美式巴黎期权的我国高管期权激励机制研究

下载PDF
导出
摘要 我国上市公司在运用高管期权激励制度时多选择美式期权合约,但其合约成本较高,容易引发高管期权对股价的短期操纵。通过比较合约授予成本,美式巴黎期权的价格在大多数情况下都低于经典美式期权。论文还比较了美式巴黎期权和经典美式期权的值和值,以此来比较两者的努力增进激励效果与追求风险激励效果。分析结果表明在合理的障碍价格下,前者的努力增进效果明显优于后者,这可以更有效地刺激高管努力经营为股东创造更大价值。对于追求风险激励效果,在不同的股价波动率水平下两者有不同的表现,从而可以满足特定的激励需求。最后论文还给出了期权种类组合、多重障碍巴黎期权等合约设计建议,为美式巴黎期权在高管期权中的应用提供思路。
出处 《人力资源管理》 2014年第4期98-104,共7页 Human Resource Management
  • 相关文献

参考文献17

  • 1Lambert, R.A. Lanen, W.N. and D. F. Larcker, Executive Stock Option Plans and Corporate Dividend Policy [J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1989(24):409-425.
  • 2Hall, B. J. and K. J. Murphy. Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options[J]. American Economic Review, 2000,90(2):209-214.
  • 3Johnson, S. A. and Y. S. Tian. The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans[J]. Journal of Financial Economics 2000,57(1):3-34.
  • 4Bernard, C. and P. Boyle .Monte Carlo methods for Pricing Discrete Parisian Options.[J].The European Journal of Finance2011,17(3): 169-196.
  • 5Chen, A., M. Pelger. New Performance-vested Stock Option Schemes." Applied Financial Economics,2013,23(8):709-727.
  • 6Longstaff, F. A. and E. S. Schwartz.Valuing AmericanOptions by Simulation: A Simple Least-squares Approach [J]. Review of Financial Studies,2001,14(1):113-147.
  • 7Haber, R. J., P. J. Sch nbucher and P. Wilmott. Pricing Parisian Options. The Journal of Derivatives,1999,6(3):71-79.
  • 8Chesney, M.M. Jeanblanc-Picque and Y.Mor Brownian Excursions and Parisian Barrier Options[J].Advances in Applied Probability,1997,29(1):165-184.
  • 9Jetley, G. and M. Gustafson, A Hybrid Approach to Valuing American Parisian Options[J].Available at SSRN 998599,2007.
  • 10张先治.股票期权理论及在公司激励中的应用研究[J].会计研究,2002(7):16-24. 被引量:73

二级参考文献48

  • 1宋颂兴,金伟根.上海股市市场有效实证研究[J].经济学家,1995(4):107-113. 被引量:161
  • 2吴世农.我国证券市场效率的分析[J].经济研究,1996,31(4):13-19. 被引量:317
  • 3王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006,22(9):101-116. 被引量:209
  • 4詹妮弗·莱因戈德.执行官们挣多少[J].商业周刊,2000,(6):56-61.
  • 5Algrawal A., Knoeber C. Firm Preformance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1996,31 (3).
  • 6Alessandro Zattoni, Alessandro Minichilli. The Diffusion of Equity Incentive Plans in Italian Listed Companies: What Is the Trigger[J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review,2009, (2).
  • 7Bebchuk & Fried. Executive Compensation as An Agency Problem[J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,(17).
  • 8Dewatripont M. & J. Tirole. A Theory of Debt and Equity[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1994,(109).
  • 9Fama, Eugene F., Jensen Michael C. Separation of Ownership and Control [J]. Journal of Law & Economics, 1983, (26).
  • 10Ghosh Chinmoy, C. F. Sirmans. Board Independence,Ownership Structure and Performance: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts[J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance Economics, 2003, 26(2).

共引文献173

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部