摘要
笔者研究管理层对股权激励行权价格的操纵行为,结果发现,管理层对行权价格的操纵表现在对股权激励计划草案公布日的时机选择,公布日之前股票价格下跌,公布日之后股票价格上涨。进一步,高管激励份额越高,公司治理水平越低,则行权价格被操纵的可能性越高。行权价格被操纵带来负面的经济后果,分别降低24个月、36个月的长期股东财富(BHAR)高达20%、25%以上。
： This paper investigates the managers＇ manipulation on exercise price. The managers manipulate exercise price by timing the announcement of stock option plan draft, which induces the decrease of stock price before the announcement and the increase after that. Furthermore, the tendency of manipulated exercise price is stronger when the managers obtain more stock options and the corpo- rate governance is weaker. The manipulated exercise price leads to negative economic consequence by decreasing 24 months and 36 months long-term shareholder wealth for more than 20%, 25% respectively.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期146-152,共7页
Economic Survey
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71203067)
华南农业大学"211工程"三期重点学科建设项目
关键词
行权价格
管理层权力
高管激励份额
公司治理
长期股东财富
Exercise Price
Managerial Power
Manager Option
Corporate Governance
Long-term Shareholder Wealth
