一类两级供应链统一批量价格和保修期决策

Warranty and same wholesale price decisions in a two-echelon supply chain

针对由单个供应商和两个相互竞争制造商组成的两级供应链,其中供应商是领导者,制造商是跟随者,生产两种替代性产品,讨论供应商统一批量价格策略和制造商保修期策略.采用逆序归纳法研究该供应链成员之间的博弈行为.首先,讨论两个制造商之间的博弈行为,得到了保修期最优反应函数和唯一的Nash均衡.然后,讨论供应商的批量价格策略,得到了具体的解析表达式.并采用数值算例,针对两制造商的区别只是市场规模不同的特例,刻画了供应商和制造商的策略和单位时间利润的变化规律.

This paper studied warranty and wholesale price decisions of a supply chain with one suppli-er and two competing manufacturers in which the supplier is leader and the two manufacturers are follower manufacturing substitutable products .By using backward induction ,the strategy behavior of the supply chain members had been investigated .We first discussed the game of the two manufactur-ers and obtained the Nash equilibrium ,and then discussed w holesale price decision and had the ana-lytical solution .Finally ,via a numerical example ,we described that the impact on the supply chain members of difference of the two manufacturers is size of the market .