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Husserl on Intentionality as an Essential Property of Consciousness

Husserl on Intentionality as an Essential Property of Consciousness
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摘要 In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition (Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.) generally share the following two commitments: (i) intentionality is an essential property of consciousness; and (ii) all intentional states are directed at, and are intentionally related to, objects. This view of consciousness has two pressing problems. Firstly, philosophers such as John Searle and David Rosenthal have suggested raw feelings and some forms of seemingly undirected and thus non-intentional feelings as counterexamples to the essential intentionality of conscious states. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Follesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective. In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition (Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.) generally share the following two commitments: (i) intentionality is an essential property of consciousness; and (ii) all intentional states are directed at, and are intentionally related to, objects. This view of consciousness has two pressing problems. Firstly, philosophers such as John Searle and David Rosenthal have suggested raw feelings and some forms of seemingly undirected and thus non-intentional feelings as counterexamples to the essential intentionality of conscious states. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Follesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective.
作者 LI Zhongwei
出处 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》 2014年第1期87-108,共22页 中国哲学前沿(英文版)
关键词 HUSSERL CONSCIOUSNESS INTENTIONALITY Husserl, consciousness, intentionality
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参考文献14

  • 1Brentano, Franz Clemens. 2008. Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte; Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phinomene. Frankfurt [u.a.]: Ontos-Verl.
  • 2Follesdal, Dagfinn. 1969. "Husserl's Notion of Noema." The Journal of Philosophy 66.20: 680-87.
  • 3Follesdal, Dagfinn. 1990. "Noema and Meaning in Husserl." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50: 263-71.
  • 4Husserl, Edmund. 1983. Ideas I: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, translated by Fred Kersten. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
  • 5Husserl, Edmund. 2001. Logical Investigations, translated by J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge.
  • 6Mclntyre, Ronald. 1993. "Review: Bell, I-Iusserl." The Philosophical Review 102: 112-14.
  • 7Meinong, Alexius, 1929. A bhandlungen zur Erkenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
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  • 10Rosenthal, David. 1994. "Identity theories," in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Samuel Guttenplan, 348-55. Oxford: Blackwell.

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