司法预算中的府院关系:模式评估与路径选择

Judiciary-Executive Relations in Judicial Budgeting: Patterns Evaluation and Path Choice

通过考察比较法上可观察的事实,可以从行政-司法两部门互动的制度实践中提炼出司法预算过程中限制行政部门预算权力的两种模式。实体限权模式直接从预算资金入手保障司法部门获得必要的预算资源;而程序限权模式则试图通过对预算过程的制度性控制间接影响预算资金的分配结果。不同模式各有优劣,不宜预先假定某一模式具有超越语境的优越性。针对当前行政部门主导司法预算之不足,中国应当适度限制行政部门的预算权力,通过引入行政管道模型改造既有的司法预算过程,同时改良周边配套制度,给予司法部门更多的自主空间。但改革应当渐进为之。

By examining the institutional practice from the perspective of comparative law and we can generalize 2 approaches for the judiciary-executive relations in judicial budgeting sociology, Substantial approaches assure that the judiciary obtains necessary budgetary resources directly by predetermined amount proportion or amount; while the procedural approaches have effects on the budget allocation results indirectly through the institutional control of budgetary process. Different patterns have advantages and disadvantages, so we should not presuppose that a particular pattern has constant advantages beyond the others. Considering the specific political culture and institutional backgrounds, China should choose the procedural executive conduit model as the goals, while reforming the surrounding supporting systems.