基于竞争视角的地方政府债务研究述评被引量：21

A Review of Research on Local Government Debts Based on Government Competition

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摘要基于竞争视角,从公共品的提供、地方政府的负债经营、博弈论视角下的政府竞争与地方政府债务、债务风险防范四个方面对地方政府债务问题进行了梳理和分析,总结出了政府竞争对于地方政府债务的作用机制,充分阐述了自上而下的"标杆竞争"、政府追求财源行为的异化、预算软约束等与地方政府债务的内在联系,并展望了地方政府债务问题研究的进一步发展方向。 Unlike most of the literature focusing on the local government debt from the view of tax reform, this paper, based on the theory of government competition, inquiries the local government debt problem from the following four aspects ： the provi- sion of public goods, the local government＇s operation under debt, analysis of government competition and local government under game theory, debt risk prevention. This paper summarized the mechanism of government competition＇s effect on local government debt and elaborated the influence of from the top ＂yardstick competition＂, government＇s pursuit of financial re- sources and soft budget constrain on local government debt and looked forward to the future study of local government debt.

作者杨大楷汪若君夏有为

机构地区上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院大华会计事务所

出处《审计与经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2014年第1期86-94,共9页 Journal of Audit & Economics

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273165) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71073101) 上海财经大学研究生科研创新基金资助项目(CXJJ-2011-361)

关键词地方政府债务政府竞争公共品供给政府负债融资地方财政财政分权地方政府竞争 local government debt government competition public goods supply government liability financing local finance financial allocation of power local government competition

分类号 F810.4 [经济管理—财政学]

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