反收购条款、并购概率与公司价值

Antitakeover Provisions,Takeover Probability and Firm Value

本文选取A股民营上市公司2007～2011年的面板数据,对章程中设置反收购条款的影响进行了分析,实证结果表明反收购条款对并购的影响存在一个作用区间:当并购交易规模达到10%以上时,反收购条款能显著降低目标公司被并购的可能性,这时错列董事会条款将发挥主要的反收购作用;当交易规模低于10%时,反收购条款对并购概率没有显著影响,这时累积投票制能显著促进并购的发生。与国外的研究结果类似,反收购条款对目标公司价值具有显著的负向影响,反收购条款的主要作用表现为对管理层的保护。

This study provides empirical evidence on the effects of antitakeover provisions( ATPs) on takeover probability and firm value. The article selects the panel data of China's A- share private listed companies from 2007 to 2011,analyzes the influence of ATPs on target firms. The empirical results show that there exists a range that ATPs have impact on takeover probability. When the size of the transaction is more than 10%,the ATPs can significantly reduce the takeover possibility of the target company and staggered board will play a major role. When the size of the transaction is less than 10%,the ATPs have no significant effect on the takeover probability and the cumulative voting can significantly promote the occurrence of M&A. Similar to the findings of the foreign,ATPs have a significant negative effect on the value of the target company. The main role of anti- takeover provisions is the protection of the management.