PCAOB审计检查、审计师声誉与中概股危机

PCAOB Inspections,Auditor Reputation,and China Reverse Merger Frauds

本文检验美国公众公司会计监督委员会(Public Accounting Oversight Board,PCAOB)的审计检查能否降低中概股危机中问题公司出现的概率,以及审计师声誉对这一关系是否具有调节作用。爆发于2010-2012年间的中概股危机大多数涉及的是通过反向并购(Reverse Merger,RM)在美国上市的中国公司。通过系统研究这些公司的财务和审计数据,我们发现对于反向并购公司来说PCAOB审计检查能显著降低问题公司出现的概率,且对声誉较低审计师的客户这一治理作用更强。与RM样本相比,由于IPO公司更多聘请四大会计师事务所以及四大的声誉作用,PCAOB审计检查并没有显著降低IPO样本中问题公司出现的概率。综上,我们发现,PCAOB审计检查可以降低公司舞弊的概率,但这种作用集中体现在非四大审计师样本中。本文的经验证据对跨国审计监管、深刻理解中概股危机的形成及相关政策的制定具有一定的启示意义。

This paper examines whether Public Accounting Oversight Board( PCAOB) inspections decrease the fraud likelihood in the Chinese reverse merger firms' accounting crisis and whether auditor reputation moderates this relationship. By analyzing Chinese firms listed in the US stock markets through reverse merger( RM) during 2000- 2011,we find that PCAOB inspections significantly decrease accounting fraud likelihood for RM firms,especially for firms hiring low reputation auditors. But this relationship does not hold for Chinese initial public offering( IPO) firms listed in the US. The reason may be that most IPO firms hire Big 4 accounting firms,whose reputation substitutes for PCAOB inspections. Overall,our results indicate that PCAOB inspections help prevent financial frauds,but only for firms hiring non- Big 4 auditors. The results have important implications for both practitioners and regulators.