政治精英与地方政府的制度创新行为:一个分析框架

Elites and the Institutional Reform of Local Government:An Analytical Framework from the Innovative Behaviors

文章以行政审批制度改革为例探讨地方政府政治精英的制度创新行为。在检讨既有研究的基础上,构建一个用以解释我国政治精英参与制度创新的分析框架,并以F市的行政审批制度改革为例,利用实践社会学提出的"场域"、"策略"、"惯习"等概念工具,构建"设置行动场域—实施行动策略—形成创新惯习"的分析框架,以便进一步解释在相关政治制度的制约下,地方政治精英如何开展自主性制度创新活动,以及政治精英在一定的场域下维持和支撑权力体系的基本策略。

Based on the theory of practical sociology, this paper takes administrative approval system reform as an example to discuss the institutional innovation behavior of local government political elites. According to the literature review of existing research, this paper is to construct an analytical framework to explain the institutional innovation behavior of local government political elites. With the concept of field, habit, and strategy in the theory of practical sociology, this paper takes the institutional innovation behavior of F city as example and establishes an analytical framework of an action field .It discusses how the local political elites attempt to perform autonomous system reform in the existing polit- ical structure and analyzes the strategy with which the political elites to maintain and support the power system in a limited field.