资本市场的绩效压力与企业投资不足——股权制衡和两职兼任的调节作用

Capital Market Performance Pressure and Enterprises' Under-investment Behavior——The Regulation Effect of Ownership Restriction and CEO Duality

以我国2007-2012年A股制造业上市公司为研究样本，对资本市场的绩效压力与企业投资不足之间的关系进行了理论探讨和实证验证。研究结果表明：资本市场的绩效压力越大，经理人为了满足资本市场绩效预期，越倾向于放弃良好的投资机会，从而导致企业投资不足的可能性和程度都有所提高；相对于股权制衡度低、总经理和董事长两职分离的公司而言，在股权制衡度高、总经理和董事长两职兼任的公司中，资本市场的绩效压力对企业投资不足影响的可能性和程度均有所降低。

By analyzing the data of the listed manufacturing companies in China from 2007 to 2012, this study theoretically and empirically examines the effect of pressure felt by management to meet or beat analysts＇ earnings forecasts on firms＂ under-investment behaviors. We make the following conclusions. First, firms under such earnings pressure tend to adopt under-investment practice and increase under-investment. Second, power balance with shareholder structure and CEO duality weaken the positive relationship be- tween earnings pressure and under-investment.