投资者保护、关联交易与公司绩效——来自长三角A股上市公司的经验证据

Investor protection,related party transactions and corporate performance——Empirical Evidence from the Yangtze River Delta A-shares of the listed Corporation

以2007～2009年长三角地区A股上市公司为研究样本，以投资者保护为切入点，分析投资者保护、关联交易对公司治理效率的影响。研究表明：长三角地区上市公司普遍存在控股股东，董事长来源于控股股东的公司关联交易明显多于其他公司，总经理来自控股股东的公司关联交易不明显，关联交易与投资者保护程度负相关，投资者保护程度与公司治理正相关。

This paper tries to integrate the protection of investors, related party transactions and corporate performance into a unified framework for research. Taking the Yangtze river delta region （2007 - 2009） A-share listed companies as research samples, this paper analyzes the effect of investor protection and related party transactions on the corporate governance efficiency, with an aim of protecting the investors. Research shows that listed companies in Yangtze river delta are generally controlled by a controlling shareholders; in companies whose board chairmen are delegated by controlling shareholders related party transactions occur significantly more than in other companies, while in companies where the general managers come from the controlling shareholders related party transactions are less seen; related party transactions is negatively related to the degree of investor protection; and the degree of investor protection are positively correlated with good corporate governance.