媒体监督、内部控制质量与管理层代理成本

Media Supervision,Quality of Internal Control and Agency Cost

基于公司外部治理机制和内部治理机制的角度,研究媒体监督与内部控制质量对我国A股上市公司管理层代理成本的影响,结果表明:媒体监督与内部控制质量具有降低管理层代理成本的作用;不同性质的媒体报道对不同产权背景下企业的监督治理作用不同;同时,媒体监督与内部控制质量具有互补关系,二者的整合治理能更有效地降低管理层代理成本,保护相关者利益。

From the perspective of external and internal governance mechanisms of a company, the effect of the quality of media supervision and internal control on the agency cost of the management of China＇s listed companies is explored. Further study finds that under the background of different property rights, media reports （negative or non-negative reports） play the role of monitoring in the state-owned enterprises, but for non-state-owned enterprises, only negative media reports have this function; finally, media supervision and internal control have the complementary relationship. These conclusions mean that we should make the external and internal governance mechanisms work in concert in order to reduce the agency costs effectively and protect the stakeholders.