政府工程多属性招投标博弈分析

A Game Analysis Based on Multi-attribute Bidding of Government Project

一些大型或技术复杂的政府工程确定赢标人时除投标价格因素外,还将质量、工期等因素纳入考虑。为此,文章将政府工程招投标时招标人、竞标人的参与选择过程视为一个要约、承诺和定标的三阶段动态博弈,并构建了政府工程多属性招投标非合作动态博弈模型。然后将投标价格视为竞标质量和工期的函数,求出了投标人的最优竞标战略。通过分析发现投标质量和提前工期分别超过某点后,投标人的收益分别是其投标质量和提前工期的增函数,而在到达该点之前,投标质量和提前工期边际收益递减;招标人的投标承诺质量和提前工期偏好系数越大,竞标人的收益越高,其结果是招标人故意夸大其质量、工期偏好系数,以诱导竞标人投标,增大招标剩余。最后通过算例验证了模型的有效性。

Determining the winning bidder of some major or technically complex government project is not only the price, bat also the quality and duration etc. So, the paper regards the selection process of government project tenderee and bidder as a three-stage dynamic game of offer, commitment and evaluation, and to build a non-coop- erative and dynamic game model based on multi-attribute government project bidding, and then to consider the price of a function of quality and duration, to find out the optimal bidding strategy of bidder. The analysis turns up that the quality and advanced time respectively after reach one point, the bidder＇ s earnings are a rise function of quality and advance time, and then the bidder＇ s earnings would be a decrease function if it before reaches the point. The bidder＇ s earnings would be much more if the preferences coefficient is much greater of quality and ad- vance time by which tenderee promises, so to gain more bidding surplus, the tenderee would exaggerate the preferences coefficient of quality and advance times. At last, this paper verifies the validity of the model by using exampies.