随机市场价及公司可违约下的农民专业合作社博弈分析

A game analysis on the cooperatives under stochastic market price and reneging of company

探讨了在市场价格随机分布下的订单农业供应链中公司一方可违约的农民专业合作社博弈问题,并构建了订单农业供应链期望收益决策模型,得到了可违约模式下的农民专业合作社期望收益最优值存在的条件。研究结论表明:对于市场价呈随机分布的订单农业模式,不可违约模式给农民专业合作社所带来的期望收益等于或优于可违约模式。通过算例分析可知:对于服从均匀分布的随机市场价,可违约模式下的农民专业合作社期望收益函数随着合同单价的增加,其先后表现为递增、凹函数及常数性质的复杂变化;市场单价波动越大,可违约模式下的合同单价设定的越高,同时农民专业合作社期望收益函数受市场单价波动影响而呈凸函数性质。

Based on the perspective of the cooperatives, the order pricing model was constructed and the conditions under which the optimal expected profit existed was identified. The result showed the expected profit for contract with reneging is no better than that for contract without reneging for the cooperatives. By numerical analysis for the uniformly distributed market price, the expected profit function of the cooperatives was increasing, concave and constant in turn with increasing the contract price in the mode of contract with reneging. With increasing the volatility of the market price, the contract price was increased and the expected profit function of the cooperatives was convex.