信息不对称、制度约束与投资效率——基于不同产权安排的实证研究

Information Asymmetry, Institutional Constraints and Investment Efficiency:Evidence from Different Property Rights Arrangements

本文区分两种不同性质的投资-现金流相关性,从信息不对称和制度约束两个角度,对我国不同产权安排下的资本投资效率进行分析和检验。研究发现,地方国有企业更有可能出现"现金流富余-投资过度"相关性,缓解道德风险的公司治理和减少政府干预的政府治理有利于改善其投资效率;非国有企业更有可能出现"现金流不足-投资不足"相关性,为解决逆向选择而增强信息透明度和为克服制度性金融歧视而改善融资条件有助于提高其投资效率。

From the perspectives of information asymmetry and institutional constraints, this paper distinguishes two different kinds of investment-cash flow correlation and analyzes and tests the investment efficiency under different property rights ar- rangements in China. Evidences suggest the following results： Companies controlled by local government are more inclined to have ＂free cash flow-overinvestment correlation＂. Both corporate governance which mitigates moral risk and government gover- nance which mitigates government intervention help these companies to improve investment efficiency. Companies controlled by private persons are more likely to have ＂insufficient cash fiow-underinvestment correlation＂. Both information transparency which alleviates adverse selection and financial constrains releasing which alleviates institutional financial discrimination help these companies to improve investment efficiency.