母公司持股、子公司管理层权力与创新行为关系研究——来自我国高科技上市公司的经验数据

Study on the Relationship between the Parent Company Shareholding,Subsidiary Management Power and Innovation Behavior——Empirical Data From China's High-Tech Listing Corporations

本文以我国高科技上市公司作为研究样本,对母公司持股、子公司管理层权力与创新行为之间的关系进行实证分析,得出以下结论:母公司持股比例越高,子公司管理层权力越弱;母公司持股比例越高,子公司创新行为越少;子公司管理层权力对子公司创新行为存在正向推动作用;子公司管理层权力在母公司持股与子公司创新行为之间存在部分中介作用。同时,探讨了产品市场竞争在母公司持股比例与子公司管理层权力之间的调节效应。结果表明,产品市场竞争程度越高,母公司持股比例与子公司管理层权力的负向相关性越强,产品市场竞争程度的降低会弱化母公司持股比例与子公司管理层的负向相关关系。

Parent and subsidiary company institution is one of the most important and complex modern enter- prise system emerged after the socialized production reach a certain extent, and at present most business groups of our country take this organization form. In this organization, an important content of corporate governance is the pow- er allocation of parent and subsidiary company, the rationality of power allocation of parent and subsidiary companies greatly influences the decision-making and the development trend of the subsidiaries, so make research of the influ- enced factors and effects of subsidiary management power allocation and arrangement plays an important role in en- hancing the level of corporate governance and corporate performance. Based on the above analysis, the authors take the going-concern high-tech listing corporation as research samples, make empirical analysis on the relationship be- tween the parent company shareholding, subsidiary management power and innovation behavior. And also they examine the regulation role of product market competition that in relationship between the sub- sidiary management power and innovation behavior. Compared with previous studies, the main contribution of this paper lies in ： firstly, from the positive perspective, the authors study the positive influence of subsidiary management power applies on subsidiary innovation behaviors in the parent and subsidiary companies organization form; second- ly, the authors face the agent cost and decision conflicts between the parent company and the subsidiary company management layer, and then study the reverse relationship between the parent company shareholding ratio and sub- sidiary company management power; thirdly, then the authors explore the regulatory effect of product market compe- tition plays on the parent company shareholding ratio and subsidiary company management layer power, and analy- zes, whether there are differences in constraint and control on subsidiary company management power of parent com- pany with changes of product market competition degree. Through the empirical test of 1656 sets of data for four consecutive years then the authors draw the following conclusions ： firstly, the higher the proportion of parent company shareholding is, the weaker the subsidiary manage- ment power will be; secondly, the higher the parent company shareholding proportion is, the less innovation behav- iors subsidiary will have; thirdly, subsidiary management power has a positive role in promoting subsidiary innova- tion behavior; fourthly, subsidiary management power has a partial mediating role between the parent company shareholding and the subsidiary company innovation behavior. The parent company shareholding will have a stronger negative correlation of subsidiary company management power if the product market competition degree is higher, the degree of product market competition will weaken negative correlation that the parent company shareholding pro- duce on subsidiary company management layer. Based on these research conclusions, we put forward the following policy suggestions for management practice of Chinese enterprises： first,we can reduce the parent company shareholding ratio within the group framework, and promote subsidiary equity diversification; second, we should establish the parent and subsidiary company power al- location standard and the parent subsidiary company executive association mechanism within framework of the group, reduce agency cost between the parent company and the subsidiary management layer; third, then we should construct risk evaluation system for innovation project of subsidiary company, and improve the decision-making mechanism subsidiary of innovation project.