国际谈判中的“多议题联系双层博弈”——以英美贸易与货币谈判为例

“Double-edged Game of Multi-linkage”in International Negotiation: British and American Trade and Currency Negotiation as an Example

议题联系是国际谈判中的一种常用策略,也是外交研究中一个重要课题。影响比较大的双层博弈理论主要将焦点集中在单一议题内的国内利益相关者对国际合作结局的影响,并未涉及议题之间的双层博弈,以及如何通过议题之间的联系改变国际、国内两个层面上的利益相关者的利益偏好与总体的利益格局,进而改变因单一议题内因利益僵局无法达成的谈判最终对谈判的结局产生的影响。基于英美贸易与货币谈判的史料分析,以伊·拉卡托斯科学研究纲领为研究路径,本文提出了"多议题联系双层博弈"这一假设,通过构筑形式模型使研究假设得以简化和明晰,最终,用求异法和最相似体系设计法进行案例分析并对假设进行检测。

Issue linkage is a commonly used strategy in international negotiations and is also an important topic of diplomatic studies. However, studies about issue linkage mainly focus on the international level and interac- tivity of the domestic issue linkage. But it did not involve the issues between the two-level game, and how to change the interests preferences of the stakeholders between the international and the domestic levels and the in- terests of the overall pattern, in order to change the impact of the final outcome because of the unsolved impasse in the single issue of the negotiation. Due to the analysis of the historical data and monetary and Lakatos＇ scien- tific research program, this paper proposes a hypothesis called ＂two-tier issue contact＂, builds a model to sim- plify the research hypotheses and clarity, and finally tests assumptions by using the divergent and the system de- sign method.