母子公司关联度与子公司审计师选择——基于股权制衡的调节效应视角

Associate Degree of the Parent-Subsidiary and the Subsidiary's Choice of Auditor:A Perspective from the Moderating Effects of Shareholders' Power Balance

基于委托代理理论和社会资本理论,研究母子公司关联度与子公司审计师选择之间的关系,以及股权制衡的调节作用。研究发现:较为重要且与母公司关联度较高的子公司在选择审计师时,更倾向于选择本地事务所,即审计师选择更具地域敏感性;当子公司具有较高水平的股权制衡度时,与母公司关联度较高的子公司倾向于选择具有较高声誉的事务所,即更具声誉敏感性;子公司实质型股权制衡对于审计师选择声誉敏感性的调节效应显著优于形式型股权制衡。

Based on the principal-agent theory and social capital theory, this paper studied the relationship between the associ- ate degree of parent-subsidiary companies and subsidiaries＇ choice of auditor, and the moderating effects of shareholders＇ power balance as well. The conclusions as follows ： （ 1 ） high associate degree with the parent company, a subsidiary＇s choice of audi- tor is more geographically sensitive, which means that a subsidiary tend to choose a local auditor, so it is region-sensitive （2） when the subsidiary has a high degree of shareholders＇ power balance, the subsidiary which has a high associate degree with the parent company is more sensitive about the reputation of the auditor, so it is reputation sensitive; （3） the moderating effect of the real type of shareholders＇ power balance is significantly stronger than the form type of shareholders＇ power balance.