摘要
以重庆啤酒疫苗事件为例,分析当前存在的概念炒作现象,研究上市公司择机减持国有股的行为要素及其经济后果。研究发现:尽管重庆啤酒声称多年来对疫苗研制信息是合规披露的,但由于相关监管制度的缺失与不完善,国有大股东在长期窗口中利用概念炒作获得减持机会,实现减持操作,造成股价大幅波动,损害中小股东利益。国有股减持行为只有在法律法规不断健全与完善的前提下才能达到社会福利最大化的目标。
In this article, based on the vaccine event of Chongqing Brewery Co. , Ltd, we have studied the behavioral essen- tials and the economic consequences of listed companies' reduction of state-owned shares. We have further analyzed its root cause and enlightenment for professionals in this field. We also have found that, although Chongqing Brewery Co. , Ltd once said that vaccine development information is disclosed conformity, but because of the lack and imperfect of relevant supervisory system, state-owned controlling shareholders exploit the conceptual speculation to create reasonable reduction opportunities in long-term. And the stock price volatility caused by speculation have damaged the minority shareholders' interests at the same time. In our opinion, only when the relevant laws and regulations improve continuously, the reduction of state-owned shares can hit the spot of maximum social welfare.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期85-94,共10页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71232004
71172082
70902030
71372137)
教育部人文社会科学基金项目(11XJC790015
09YJC630242)
中央高校基本科研业务费重庆大学创新基金项目(CDJXS12020020)
关键词
概念炒作
国有股减持
减持时机选择
后股权时代
股权结构
大股东减持
重庆啤酒
conceptual speculation
state-owned shares
optional time for
reduction of holding
post-equitytimes
equitystructure
share reduction of big holders
Chongqing brewery