经理人产生来源与企业未来绩效改善

The Source of New CEOs and Firm Performance——Evidence from CEO Rotations in Chinese Listed Firms

在中国,一些上市公司新产生的经理人既非来自内部晋升,也非来自严格意义上的外部聘用,而是来自与上市公司存在业务往来和资本关联的企业集团。本文把这类基于中国制度背景独特的经理人产生来源定义为经理人岗位轮换。本文基于中国上市公司的数据,实证检验了经理人产生来源与企业未来长期绩效的关系,为经理人岗位轮换的相关效应和作用机制提供了经验证据。本文的研究发现,岗位轮换在中国上市公司经理人更迭中扮演独特的角色,其改善企业未来长期绩效的作用优于内部晋升,但劣于严格意义上的外部聘用。上述效应的出现,一方面是由于并非来自内部的经理人往往有助于打破以往管理经营的窠臼、推陈出新,另一方面则与来自企业外部的经理人与企业重新签订薪酬合约使经理人激励加强有关。本文的讨论不仅为我国上市公司完善经理人更迭制度提出直接的政策建议,而且为我国行政官员管理体系中十分流行的"干部交流制度"的相关政策设计和完善带来启迪。

In some Chinese listed firms, new CEOs come neither from internal promotion nor from external recruitments, but rotate among subsidiaries in their business groups. We define this specific CEO turnover with Chinese institutional background as CEO rotations. In this paper, we empirically examine whether CEO rotations will improve firm＇s long-run future performance. This paper finds that CEO rotation plays a distinctive role in management turnover practice in Chinese listed companies. Controlled for the potential influential factors, CEO rotations improve performance more than internal promotions, but less than external recruitments. Such incentive effects come from both external and internal channels. A new CEO who comes from outside the firms will have more possibilities of doing reform and introducing changes on the one hand ; on the other hand, the pay-performance sensitivities as well as the incentives of CEOs are increased by re-signing the pay contract around CEO turnover. This paper, therefore, does not only provide the early evidence for the CEO rotation in Chinese listed firms, but also sheds light on policy implications of similar practice in the bureaucratic system for government officials.